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II.
1.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether marketing, staging, and decorating a single family residence so that it

could be sold, offering it for sale, allowing prospective purchasers to walk through the
house, and subsequently entering into a real estate purchase contract for the sale of the
residence, is sufficient "use" or "possession" by an owner to constitute a "completion of
improvement" and trigger the statute of repose found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225.

A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there IS no genume Issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). Because summary judgment involves questions of law, no
deference is granted to the district court's ruling and it is reviewed for correctness. Orvis
v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,-[ 6, 177 P.3d 600, 601; Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, ,-[ 8,
31 P.3d 572, 574.
III.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This appeal is from an Order dated August 26, 2014, stemming from the motion
for summary judgment that was filed by Superior Insulation Co., Inc. and granted by
Judge Ryan Harris. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103 (2015).
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IV.

CONTROLLING LAW

This appeal is governed by Utah's statute of repose, UTAH

CODE

ANN. § 78B-2-

225, which provides:
( 1)

As used in this section:
"Abandonment" means that there has been no design or construction
(a)
activity on the improvement for a continuous period of one year.
"Action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for
(b)
acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty arising out of or related to the design,
construction, or installation of an improvement, whether based in tort, contract,
warranty, strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or other source oflaw.
(c)
"Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion
of an improvement to real property as established by the earliest of:
(i)
a Certificate of Substantial Completion;
(ii)
a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency; or
(iii) the date offirst use or possession of the improvement.
(d)
"Improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road,
utility, or other similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration
to real property.
(e)
"Person" means an individual, corporation, limited liability company,
partnership, joint venture, association, proprietorship, or any other legal or
governmental entity.
(f)
"Provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or performing
studies, plans, specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or
quantity estimates, surveys, staking, construction, and the review, observation,
administration, management, supervision, inspections, and tests of construction for
or in relation to an improvement.

(2)

The Legislature finds that:
(a)
exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omtsswns, or
breach of duty after the possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote
and unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to the provider and the citizens of
the state;
(b)
these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage
costs, undue and unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an
improvement, and difficulties in defending against claims many years after
completion of an improvement;
(c)
these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils;
(d)
the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and
unexpected seven years following completion or abandonment; and
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(e)
except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the citizens
of the state to impose the periods of limitation and repose provided in this chapter
upon all causes of action by or against a provider arising out of or related to the
design, construction, or installation of an improvement.
(3)

An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be
commenced within six years of the date of completion of the improvement or
abandonment of construction. Where an express contract or warranty establishes
a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated within that limitations
period.
(b)
All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two
years from the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon
which a cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable diligence.
If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable before completion of the
improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year period begins to run
upon completion or abandonment.
(a)

(4)
Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an action may not be commenced against a
provider more than nine years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of
construction. In the event the cause of action is discovered or discoverable in the eighth
or ninth year of the nine-year period, the injured person shall have two additional years
from that date to commence an action.
(5)

Subsection (4) does not apply to an action against a provider:
(a)
who has fraudulently concealed his act, error, omission, or breach of duty,
or the injury, damage, or other loss caused by his act, error, omission, or breach of
duty; or
(b)
for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty.

If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action
(6)
within the periods prescribed by Subsections (3) and (4) solely because that person was a
minor or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two
years from the date the disability is removed to commence the action.
(7)
This section shall not apply to an action for the death of or bodily injury to an
individual while engaged in the design, installation, or construction of an improvement.
(8)
The time limitation imposed by this section does not apply to any action against
any person in actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or
otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately
causes the injury for which the action is brought.
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(9)
This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise
prescribed by law or a valid and enforceable contract.
(10)

This section does not create or modify any claim or cause of action.

(11) This section applies to all causes of action that accrue after May 3, 2003,
notwithstanding that the improvement was completed or abandoned before May 3, 2004.
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-2-225 (emphasis added).

V.
A.

STATEMENTOFTHECASE

Nature of the Case.

This is a multi-tiered construction defect litigation that initially involved the
homeowners, developer, general contractor, and numerous subcontractors arising from
the construction of a single family residence in Park City, Utah. However, as it
specifically pertains to the dispute between Doug Knight Construction, Inc. ("DKC") and
Superior Insulation Company, Inc. ("Superior"), the case is fairly simple. Its outcome
turns on an interpretation of the builders statute of repose, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2225, and particularly the six-year limitation for bringing contract-based actions
(subsection 3).
Superior completed its insulation work between June 27, 2005 and July 12, 2005.
On July 12, 2005, its insulation work was inspected and approved the Summit County
Building inspector and the authorization was given to begin installing drywall. On
February 24, 2006, the residence passed final inspection by Summit County, signifying
the completion of construction. Sometime in early-to-mid March 2006, the Tomlinsons
walked through the residence that had been staged, marketed, and listed for sale by the
owner, Outpost Development, Inc. ("Outpost"). On March 17, 2006, the Tomlinsons
4

made an offer to purchase the residence, which offer was accepted on April 7, 2006. A
certificate of occupancy was later issued on May 17, 2006.
Not until April 30, 2012 was Superior sued by DKC for alleged construction
defects. Superior contends (and District Court Judge Harris agreed) that the statute of
repose commenced once the residence passed final inspection and the Tomlinsons made
an offer to purchase the residence (on March 17, 2006), which events are indicative of
use or possession, and which rendered DKC's claims untimely. On the other hand, and in
reliance upon the building code, DKC contends that the only applicable trigger for the
statute of repose for a residence is the date a certificate of occupancy is issued (in this
case on May 17, 2006), regardless of what activities indicative of use or possession may
have preceded it. Superior respectfully disagrees with DKC's position as it unreasonably
limits the statute to fewer than all of its provisions and ignores the obvious "use" and
"possession" that occurred in this case.
B.

Course of Proceedings & Disposition at the District Court.

On July 30, 2010, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against DKC and others for alleged
construction defects at the Residence. R. 1-31. The Complaint was subsequently amended
on November 5, 2010. R. 72-106.
On April 30, 2012, DKC filed its Third-Party Complaint against vanous
subcontractors, including Superior, seeking to pass through to the subcontractors any
construction defects for which DKC was found responsible (DKC alleges it did not selfperform any work and, therefore, it alleges that any liability would be borne solely by its
subcontractors). R. 879-920. The Third-Party Complaint alleged causes of action against
5

the subcontractor defendants, including Superior, for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of
warranty; and (3) contribution and indemnity. !d.
On July 25, 2012, Superior filed its answer to the Third-Party Complaint, denying
any liability for the alleged construction defects and, alternatively, denying any liability
based upon the running of the statute of repose. R. 1070-1080.
On June 13, 2014, Superior filed its motion for summary judgment regarding the
statute of repose. R. 2963-3111. 1
On July 1, 2014, DKC filed its opposition to Superior's motion for summary
judgment. R. 3172-3356.
On July 9, 2014, Superior filed its reply memorandum. R. 3365-3389.
On August 12, 2014, a hearing was held before Judge Ryan Harris in which the
parties argued their respective positions. R. 3847-3848.
On August 26, 2014, Judge Harris issued his order granting Superior's motion.
Judge Harris specifically found undisputed evidence of use and possession by the fact
that Outpost staged and decorated the residence after the residence had passed final
inspection on February 24, 2006, so that it could be sold. The Tomlinsons later walked
through the residence and made an offer to purchase it on March 17, 2006. Judge Harris
concluded that Outpost's use and possession of the residence began, at the latest, on
March 17, 2006, and, accordingly, the six-year statute of repose would have expired no

1

In connection with Superior's motion for summary judgment, another subcontractor,
Thornton Plumbing and Heating, Inc. filed a joinder. The subsequent order granted both
Superior's and Thornton's motions; however, Thornton previously settled out its claims
with DKC and it does not form a part of this appeal.
6

later than March 17, 2012. The Third-Party Complaint filed on April 30, 2012 was
therefore untimely. R. 403 7-4041.
On July 2, 2015, DKC appealed the August 26, 2014 order granting Superior's
motion. R. 6226-6241.
VI.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is a construction defect dispute that arises from the construction of a single
family residence located at 8293 North Ranch Garden Road, Park City, Utah
("Residence"). Doug Knight Construction, Inc. ("DKC") was the general contractor for
the Residence. The Residence was constructed pursuant to a contract between DKC and
Lot 84 Deer Crossing, LLC ("Lot 84"). R. 3372. Thereafter, Outpost Development, Inc.
("Outpost") acquired the property from Lot 84 (R. 817), and Outpost ultimately sold the
Residence to Joseph and Amy Tomlinson2 ("Tomlinson") in 2006. R. 3205-3214.
A building permit for the Residence was issued on August 5, 2004, and
construction of the Residence continued throughout 2005, with Superior Insulation Co.
Inc. ("Superior") completing its scope of work between June 27, 2005 and July 12, 2005.
R. 3252-3253; 3367; 3373. Superior was hired to perform the insulation installation at the
Residence. There was no formal written subcontract between DKC and Superior; rather,
Superior completed its scope of work based upon a bid that had been submitted and
accepted by DKC and Superior thereafter invoiced for the work it performed on the
Residence. R. 3367-3368.
2

Joseph and Amy Tomlinson divorced at some point after the filing of this lawsuit so
references herein to Amy Tomlinson and to Amy Ewing are references to the same
person.
7

On July 12, 2005, the Summit County Building Inspector, Dennis Chart, inspected
and approved the insulation work that had been performed by Superior and he provided
the authorization to DKC (and its subcontractors) to begin installing the drywall. R. 3367.
Superior did not perform any work on the Residence after completing its initial scope of
work in July of2005. R. 3367.
Other subcontractors on the project continued to work on Residence until such
time as the Residence was completed. On February 24, 2006, the Residence passed final
inspection by the Summit County Building Inspector. R. 3368; 4056.
The Residence was subsequently staged, listed, marketed and made ready for
prospective buyers to walk through and view. R. 3239-41; 3369; 4062-63. At some point
between February 24, 2006 and March 17, 2006, the Tomlinsons first walked through the
Residence.Jd.; 4037-4041. At the time of the walkthrough, and according to Amy Ewing
(Tomlinson), the Residence was "finished ... decorated ... completed ... [and] totally
finished." ld. The Tomlinsons had no interaction with DKC or the designer, Clive
Bridgewater, as it was a "spec house." ld The Tomlinsons liked the Residence and
offered to purchase it on March 17, 2006. R. 3205-3214. The offer was subsequently
accepted by Outpost and the Real Estate Purchase Contract for the Residence was fully
executed on April 7, 2006.ld.
On May 17, 2006, six weeks after entering into the REPC for the sale of the
Residence, an application was submitted and Summit County issued a certificate of
occupancy for the Residence. R. 3237-3238.
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In 2010, Plaintiff instigated this lawsuit against DKC and others alleging
construction defects with the Residence. R. 1-31. Among the alleged construction defects
are allegations that the insulation was not installed properly by Superior back in 2005. R.
72-106. On April 30, 2012, DKC filed its Third-Party Complaint against several
subcontractors, including Superior. R. 879-920.

VII.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Summary judgment was properly entered in this case and the order of Judge Harris
should be affirmed. The undisputed facts in this case clearly and unquestionably show
that the Residence was being used, staged, marketed and was under a contract for sale
prior to the date the certificate of occupancy was issued. While a certificate of occupancy
is a trigger for the statute of repose, it is not the only trigger. "Use" or "possession" also
will trigger the running of the statute of repose and, according to UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-2-225(3), it is the earliest occurring event that triggers the statute, with no priority
given to any one triggering event. In other words, while a certificate of occupancy can
trigger the statute, that was not the earliest event as it pertains to the Residence in this
case. Once the Residence was used/possessed by Outpost no later than March 17, 2006, 3
the statute of repose began running and it expired prior to the time that DKC brought suit
against Superior. The fact that the building code might provide different provisions, or
emphasize a certificate of occupancy, is irrelevant given the vastly different purposes of
the two statutes.
Superior alternatively argued that the use of its improvement commenced after its work
was inspected and approved (i.e., in July 2005). For that time going forward, the thenowner was using the improvement provided by Superior.
3
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Judge Harris' Order should also be affirmed as to the dismissal of the
indemnity/contribution claim. Utah case law provides that indemnity and contribution
claims find their roots in contract law, and it was therefore proper to apply the six-year
repose period from the builders statute of repose to this cause of action. In light of this
caw law, and in the absence of specific case law to the contrary, there was no plain error.
The plain error doctrine was not raised below in any event, which resulted in its waiver
on appeal.
Finally, there is no legal or equitable basis to toll the running of the statute of
repose and the public policy considerations - given the Legislature's codified intent
regarding the evils of stale litigation and the protections afforded to defendants - weigh
in favor of Superior.
VIII. ARGUMENT
A.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(3)(a) is triggered by the

earliest of the three

stated conditions.

The repose period set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(3)(a) governs the
timeliness of the contractually-based claims asserted by DKC against Superior. 4 UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(3)(a) provides as follows:
An action by or against a provider based in contract or
warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date of
completion of the improvement or abandonment of
construction. Where an express contract or warranty
establishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be
initiated within that limitations period.
All ofDKC's claims are contract-based. The claims specific asserted are: (1) Breach of
Contract; (2) Breach of Warranty; and, as discussed further below, (3) Contribution and
Indemnity.
4
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UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-2-225(3)(a) (emphasis added).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(l)(c) amplifies our understanding of subsection

3(a) by providing the following definition regarding "completion of improvement":
"Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of
an improvement to real property as established by the earlier of
(i) a Certificate of Substantial Completion;
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency; or
(iii) the date of first use or possession of the improvement.
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-2-225(l)(c) (emphasis added).

Finally, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(l)(d) provides the following definition of
what constitutes an "improvement":
"Improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility,
or other similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration
to real property.
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-2-225(l)(d) (emphasis added).

Reading these three statutes together, and applying them to this case, any
improvement is "complete" for purposes of commencing the clock for the statute of
repose at the earliest occurrence of one of four triggering events: (i) the date a certificate
of substantial completion is issued; 5 (ii) the date a certificate of occupancy is issued; (iii)
the date of first use of the improvement; or (iv) the date of first possession of the
improvement. While potentially all of these events may ultimately occur during the life of
an improvement, it is the first-to-occur of these events that matters when analyzing the

5

Superior does not dispute DKC's assertion that a certificate of substantial completion
was not issued in this case.
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timeliness of claims subject to the statute of repose. Any contractually-based cause of
action brought more than six years after the earliest of any of these events is barred by
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(3)(a).

Notably, the Legislature drafted section 3(a) in the disjunctive, meaning that any
of the various triggers will start the repose period, with no trigger being more favored or
preferred over another. In addition, subsection (iii) is also drafted in the disjunctive,
meaning that "use" or "possession" of the improvement is all that is required to trigger
the statute so as to provide the maximum protection to potential defendants. 6
Accordingly, a clear reading of the statute provides that for any improvement- which is
broadly defined as "any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar
man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property" - the earliest
date upon which the statute of repose could commence could very well be the date a
certificate of occupancy is issued, but that is not necessarily always and in all
circumstances the earliest date. A certificate of substantial completion, use of the
6

Definitions for "use" or "possession" are not provided in the statute so they are defined
according to regular usage. Rapela v. Green, 2012 UT 57, ~ 19, 289 P.3d 428. Each is
defined as follows:
Use - "to employ for some purpose; put into service; make use of; to avail oneself
of; apply to one's own purposes." http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/use?s=t (March
2,2016).
Possession - "ownership; actual holding or occupancy, either with or without
rights of ownership;" http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/possession?s=t (March 2,
2016); see also ''possess" ("to have as belonging to one; have as property; own".
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/possess?s=t (February 17, 2016). Compare to
"occupancy" ("the act, state, or condition of being or becoming a tenant or of living in or
taking up quarters or space in or on something."). http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/occupancy?s=t (March 2, 2016).
Certainly, based upon these definitions, occupancy may be a form of use or
possession, but use or possession does not require occupancy.
12

improvement, or possession of the improvement could all precede the date a certificate of
occupancy is issued, and any of these events would trigger the statute of repose according
to its clear, unambiguous, and plain terms. No other reading or application of the statute
makes any sense if each section of the statute is to be given full effect:
Utah courts' 'primary objective' when interpreting statutes is 'to give effect
to the intent of the legislature.' Rapela v. Green, 2012 UT 57, ~ 19, 289
P.3d 428. Court look 'first to the statute's plain language and presume that
the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its
ordinary and accepted meaning.' Id. Furthermore, courts must construe
statutes 'such that no part or provision will be inoperative or superfluous,
void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another." Id.
DKC's Brief, p. 29 (emphasis added).
Superior could not agree more with this principle and it is the application of this
principle that is fatal to DKC's argument. Only by ignoring the other sections of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(3)(a) can DKC argue that the certificate of occupancy is the
earliest and dispositive triggering event. However, each subsection was "advisedly"
inserted into the statute and each subsection must be given effect.
1.

The District Court correctly concluded that the Tomlinson Residence
was used or possessed by Outpost no later than March 17, 2006.

The undisputed facts in this case indicate that the Tomlinson Residence was used
or possessed, and the statute of repose was triggered, prior to the date a certificate of
occupancy was issued. Specifically, in approximately early March 2006, the Tomlinsons
walked through the Residence as prospective buyers. 7 R. 3205-3214; 3239-3241, 3368;

Although the precise date of the walk-through is unknown, such a walk-through would
necessarily had to have occurred after final inspection on February 24, 2006 and prior to
7
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4037-4041. By that time the Residence was completed, Summit County had already
issued its final inspection, the home had been staged with furniture, and it was being
marketed for sale by Outpost as a finished residential home. R. 3239-3241; 3368; 40374041. Although the residence was not yet occupied, Outpost was clearly in possession of
the home in March 2006 as it was actively trying to sell it to the Tomlinsons or another
potential buyer. !d. Outpost was also clearly using the home in March 2006 through its
marketing and staging activities. !d. Possession, use, decorating, ability to control access,
entering into contractual agreements, and marketing for sale are all activities that are
common to homeowners and consistent with the purpose for which the Residence was
constructed, even if it was not yet occupied. Indeed, Superior struggles to identify what
interest DKC claims that Outpost had in the Tomlinson Residence in March 2006 if it
was not using or possessing it (it clearly owned it). In any event, this use or possession

the Tomlinsons making an offer to buy the house on March 17, 2006. The specific
testimony given by Ms. Ewing (Tomlinson) in this regard was as follows:
Q. When you first saw the home, what was the state of construction?
A. It was nice. It was finished. It was decorated. It was completed. It was really a
beautiful house.
Q. And so was the construction totally finished when you -A. Totally finished.
Q. So then you were never on-site when the building was being built?
A.No.
Q. I take it, then, that during the construction process you didn't have any
interaction -A.No.
Q. --with Doug Knight Construction?
A.No.
Q. And with respect to the original home, I take it you wouldn't have had any
interaction with Clive Bridgewater concerning the design of the home??
A. No. It was a spec house.
R. 3239-41; 3369; 4037-4041; 4062-63.
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clearly occurred earlier than the date the certificate of occupancy was issued. 8 This does
not render the certificate of occupancy section inoperative or superfluous - as DKC
mistakenly argues- but merely that, in this case, use and/or possession predated the other
event. Had the Legislature intended to make a certificate of occupancy the only triggering
event, the other two triggering events would not have been placed in the statute. As the
statute is written, and as applied to these facts, the District Court properly concluded that
Outpost was using the Tomlinson house in March 2006 such that the statute of repose
was triggered and expired prior to the time that DKC brought suit against Superior in
April2012.
Additionally, "use" or "possession" are legislatively-established triggers for the
commencing of the statute of repose. These triggers are not limited by the type of
8

DKC argues that there is a question of fact regarding use or possession prior to the
issuance of a certificate of occupancy that should preclude summary judgment. However,
even reading the facts in DKC's favor, there is no question that the Residence was used
or possessed prior to March 17, 2006, making the exact date of the Tomlinsons' walk
through irrelevant. Prior to March 17, 2006, Outpost staged the Residence with furniture;
it listed it for sale; prospective purchasers were able to enter the house and view it;
potential buyers, such as the Tomlinsons, were able to make offers on the home, which
they did on March 17, 2006; and Outpost executed a contract for its sale on April 7, 2006.
There is no question of fact as to the date the Tomlinsons made their offer to purchase or
the date the offer was accepted by Outpost. Similarly, based upon the uncontroverted
testimony of Amy Ewing (Tomlinson), there is no question that the Tomlinsons walked
through the completed Residence at some time prior to the date they offered to purchase
the Residence. The walk through also necessarily occurred after February 24, 2016,
which was the date of final inspection, because Ms. Ewing testified that the Residence
was completed and had been staged with furniture. Any other reading of these facts
makes no sense in light of the documents and testimony in this case. DKC did not
provide any evidence that the Tomlinsons made their offer to purchase the Residence
before they walked through it. However, no matter what day the walk through occurred
during this window of time (February 24 and March 17), it would not impact the
determination of the running of the statute of repose as the Third-Party Complaint was
not filed against Superior until April 30, 2012.
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building constructed or the improvement made, but apply to all improvements (the statute
uses the word "any" to convey the broadest meaning). Thus, DKC's suggestion that
somehow certificates of occupancy only apply to the construction of buildings, and that
"use or possession" was intended to apply only to non-occupiable structures such as
pools or fences, is unsupported by the statute or any case law of which Superior is aware
(nor was any cited by DKC). There is no basis for carving out certain portions of the
statute of repose based upon the type of improvement at issue. Each of the triggers in the
statute of repose apply equally to all improvements, including the single family residence
at issue in this case.
2.

The building code is irrelevant to UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-2-225 as the
two statutes serve very different purposes.

DKC argues that the Utah building code, UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-56-1 et seq.,
prevented Outpost from using or possessing the Residence prior to the date a certificate
of occupancy was issued such that the earliest date the Residence could have been "used"
was the date of the certificate of occupancy (May 17, 2006). Aside from the statutory
interpretation problems with this argument (see supra), DKC's argument would
unreasonably and irrationally promote form over substance.
There is no dispute in this case that, prior to the Issuance of a certificate of
occupancy, the Tomlinson Residence had been staged, it was being marketed, it was
being shown to prospective purchasers in March 2006, and that a REPC was executed by
the Tomlinsons for purchase of the residence on March 17, 2006. All these facts are
indicative of actual use or possession and must be ignored to find that the certificate of
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occupancy was the earliest event to occur that triggered the statute of repose. However,
there is no priority given to any of the various triggers in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2225(3) nor is there any exception for the provisions in the building code to elevate one
provision over another. While the building code may provide some regulatory constraints
against inhabiting a building prior to the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, that does
not mean that, for purposes of the statute of repose, an improvement cannot be used or
possessed prior to the issuance of a certificate of occupancy.
Such is the case as the building code and the builders statute of repose serve very
different purposes. A certificate of occupancy is obtained through an application to the
applicable city/county where the building is located and it documents that all applicable
inspections have been completed and that the building is suitable for habitation. It occurs
after the applicable government official has already completed a final inspection of the
building and certified that the building has been completed and constructed according to
the applicable building code. Its purpose is to protect the safety of inhabitants. By its very
terms, a certificate of occupancy prohibits occupancy prior to issuance; not use or
possession. Occupancy - or living in the improvement - is also only one type of use that
can be made of an improvement. There are many other types of uses of the improvement,
as well as possession, that do not require a certificate of occupancy. At best, occupying
an improvement without a certificate of occupancy could result in a fine, but even under
those circumstances, the improvement is still being used or possessed even without such
a certificate.
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On the other hand, the statute of repose is intended to protect the contractors who
have performed the construction. As a statute of repose, the time period commences upon
the occurrence of a specified event regardless of the knowledge of the party against
whom the statute is running. Despite the provisions in the building code, and with no
provision or exception for residential buildings as different in character from any other
improvement, the Legislature deemed it reasonable to commence the running of the
builders statute of repose at the earliest of the events enumerated in UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-2-225(3) so as not to subject contractors to the evils of having the threat of litigation
over their heads for years on end. 9 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(2) for the
legislative purposes and justifications for the statute (see also infra).

9

So important are the protections of the statute of repose that some states, such as Texas
and South Carolina, will commence the statute of repose upon the completion of the
individual contractor's work. See, e.g., Gordon v. Western Steel Co'"' 950 S.W.2d 743,
748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) ("Where different subcontractors were responsible for the
construction of different parts of a larger project, the statute of repose should be applied
to each of those individual subcontractors when they have completed their respective
improvements."); Ocean Winds Corp. of Johns Island v. Lane, 556 S.E.2d 377, 380 (S.C.
2001) ("The legislature could not have intended that the date upon which a subcontractor
... becomes free from liability with regard to a particular job hinges upon the diligence
of the general contractor and/or developer in completing construction. To so hold would
subject the subcontractor to the economic and emotional burdens of litigation and liability
for an indefinite period of time.").
The rationale for this makes sense. For a house or a development where there may be a
considerable amount of time between when the foundation is dug or the mass excavating
done as compared to the painter or the landscaper, it makes little sense that a different
repose period should apply to the various contractors based solely on their trade. It makes
even less sense if the improvement is part of a multi-phase development that may take
years to complete. For instance, if an excavator clears the land and prepares the building
lots, its work is immediately being used by the contractors that follow to the benefit of
the owner. However, if the excavator must await a certificate of occupancy or
abandonment, the effective statute of repose for that excavator could be well in excess of
the six years contemplated by the statute.
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The building code and the statute of repose therefore serve very different purposes
and have very different intended beneficiaries. There is also no exception in the builders
statute of repose to the extent it might conflict with the building code. Accordingly, there
is no basis, and the connection is far too tenuous, to consider the building code's
provisions as somehow influencing the clear provisions of the builders statute of repose.
B.

The District Court properly dismissed DKC's indemnity/contribution claim.

Judge Harris in his Order ruled that, like the breach of contract and breach of
warranty claims, DKC's indemnity/contribution claim was contractually-based and
therefore were subject to the six-year repose period in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(3).
Judge Harris ruled properly in this regard. However, on appeal, DKC now argues- and
acknowledges that it argues - for the first time on appeal, reversal under the plain error
doctrine. Aside from the waiver issues, Judge Harris was correct and his Order should be
affirmed.

Even in this case, where only one single family residence was being constructed,
Superior completed its scope of work more than seven months before the certificate of
final inspection was issued, meaning that Superior had a much longer repose period than
the painter, for instance, but a shorter repose period than the excavator. However, once a
contractor completes its work, the owner is immediately reaping the benefit of that
improvement. For instance, in this case, once Superior finished its insulation work, the
residence was immediately receiving the benefit of that insulation (i.e., in the language of
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225, the insulation improvement was being "used" and
"possessed."). In this regard, at the earliest, the statute of repose as applied to Superior
could have begun in July 2005 when Superior completed its insulation work, but at the
latest it began when the house was completed and put under contract in March 2006.
Under either scenario, the statute of repose ran before DKC filed suit.
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1.

DKC's argument was not preserved for appeal.

The doctrine of waiver as it pertains to arguments raised for the first-time on
appeal is as well-established as it is strict. The Utah Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals have repeatedly held and refused to consider arguments that are raised for the
first time on appeal. See, e.g., In reAdoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, 266 P.3d 702;

State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, 44 P.3d 805; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789
(Utah 1991); Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State Dept. of Transp., 2011 UT 35,
266 P .3d 671 (citing State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41,

~

18, 48 P .3d 931 ); Westmont

Maintenance Corp. v. Vance, 2013 UT App 236, 313 P.3d 1149. Such is the
(acknowledged) fact here as to DKC's arguments regarding the plain error doctrine as it
relates to its indemnity/contribution arguments. For this reason alone, this Court should
deny DKC's attempt to assert on appeal arguments raised for the first time.
Superior recognizes that, in very limited and exceptional circumstances, the plain
error doctrine can come to the rescue of a litigant who failed to fully brief the issues in
the court below. See, e.g., Meadow Valley Contractors, 266 P.3d at 677, 2011 UT 35,

~

19. However, Superior disagrees that DKC may now raise its new arguments on appeal.
DKC offers no reason why it could not have raised these arguments below and is instead
just seeking to augment its arguments on appeal. The builders statute of repose has not
changed; there is no new landscape-altering case law; and the statute was cited
extensively in the briefing below. The complications and inadequate record created by a
second bite at the apple on appeal are precisely why the waiver doctrine is consistently
upheld, and why it should apply here.
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2.

DKC fails to satisfy the plain error doctrine.

Even if DKC can overcome the doctrine of waiver, Superior respectfully disagrees
that the plain error doctrine applies in this case. Although there is no case law addressing
the specific issue of whether indemnity and contribution claims are contract-based claims
subject to the six-year repose period or some other repose period for purposes of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(2), there is case law in Utah to suggest generally that indemnity
and contribution claims are contract-based claims (see infra). DKC also pled its
indemnity/contribution claim as contract-based claim (see infra). Thus, there was no
"plain error" committed by the trial court. DKC also failed to cite any case law to suggest
that its implied indemnity/contribution claim is somehow not contractually based. 10 Any
other conclusion makes little sense in this case.
3.

DKC's indemnity/contribution claim is a contract-based claim subject
to the six-year repose period.

If the indemnity/contribution claim is not contractually-based, it would be barred by
the economic loss rule in any event. The Utah Supreme Court has stated with regard to
such claims that:
The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine that marks the
fundamental boundary between contract law, which projects expectancy
interests created through agreement between the parties, and tort law, which
protects individuals and their property from physical harm by imposing a
duty of reasonable care. Absent physical property damage or bodily
injury, this doctrine prohibits recovery of economic losses. Economic
losses are defined as: damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and
replacement of defective product, or consequent loss of profits - without
any claim of personal injury or damage to other property . .. as well as
the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality
and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured
and sold.
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Assoc. v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing,
LC, 2009 UT 65, ,-r 18, 221 P .3d 234, 242 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Under a contract or some other theory, DKC's indemnity/contribution claim still fails.
10
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Like the other contract claims that are barred by the six-year statute of repose,
indemnity and contribution claims are also contract-based claims subject to the six-year
repose period. The Utah Supreme Court has found that:
Except for an indemnity action growing out of a U.C.C. action for the sale
of goods, see Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah
1984 ), it makes no difference what the underlying claim is that gives rise to
an action for indemnity. A common-law indemnity action is based on a
theory of quasi-contract or contract implied in law and is generally held to
be governed by the statute of limitations applicable to actions on implied
contracts.
See Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Investment Inc., 794 P .2d 11, 19 (Utah

1990).
In other words, an indemnity/contribution claim finds its basis in contract law. As
a contract-based claim, it is subject to the repose period applicable to contracts set forth
in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(3)(a), and similar to the other contract claims, this
claim was not brought within six years of first use or possession.
DKC seeks to avoid application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(3) by arguing
that, because indemnity and contribution are separately enumerated in the definition of
"action" set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(l)(b), that somehow these actions
are somehow transmuted into "other actions" rather than the contract-based actions that
they are. Such is an improper reading of the statute.
Superior and DKC did not have a written agreement that had a contractual
indemnity or contribution provision. However, such claims could only arise out of the
contractual relationship between DKC and Superior (the parties had no other relationship
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or independent duties running between them and tort claims would be barred by the
economic loss rule). Inasmuch as these claims would necessarily have to impliedly arise
out of the contractual relationship, they should be governed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B2-225(3)(a) as actions " ... by or against a provider based in contract or warranty." The
fact that the statute separately enumerates indemnity and contribution claims does not
change their character as contract-based claims in this case.
DKC also seeks to avoid application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(3) by
arguing that its indemnity/contribution claim is subject to the two-year accrual period of
discovery. However, such reasoning runs directly contrary to the purpose of the statute
and would allow the commencement of construction defect claims against subcontractors
numerous years after the completion of an improvement. DKC's proposed interpretation
- which is essentially a tolling argument in disguise 11

-

would disregard the plain

There is no tolling of a statute of repose. See Willis v. DeWitt, 2015 UT App. 123,350
P.3d 250; Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir.
2013); P. Stolz Family P'ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2004); First United
Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F .2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989)
(commenting that "a statute of repose is typically an absolute time limit beyond which
liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any reason because to do so would upset the
economic balance struck by the legislative body"); Jones v. Saxon Mortgage, Inc., 537
F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that it is "easy to understand why a statute of
repose is typically an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists and is
not tolled for any reason. To permit tolling of a statute of repose would upset the
economic best interests of the public as a whole"); McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d
926, 930 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that a statute of repose "serves as an unyielding and
absolute barrier to a cause of action, regardless of whether that cause has accrued")
(quoting Klein v. DePuy, Inc., 506 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Munoz v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2003); McDonald v. Sun
Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 779-80 (9th Cir. 2008) ("A statute of repose ... can bar a suit
even before the cause of action could have accrued, or, for that matter, retroactively after
the cause of action has accrued. . . . It is not concerned with the plaintiff's diligence; it is
11
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language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225 and the expressed Legislative intent of the
statute. There is no tolling of the statute and any express or implied arguments for tolling
must be rejected.
Despite DKC's arguments, the fact most fatal to DKC's attempt to recast its
indemnity/contribution claim as something other than a contract claim is the language of
the Third-Party Complaint. Paragraphs 39 and 41 of the Third-Party Complaint provides
as follows:
39.
With respect to the Tomlinson's Home Defects claims against
Knight Construction, to the extent that any liability attaches to Knight
Construction, such liability is the direct, proximate and natural result of

concerned with the defendant's peace.") (quoting Underwood Cotton Co. v. Hyundai, 288
F.3d 405, 408-09 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Simmonds v.
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that a
statute of repose is "a firm bar that is not subject to tolling"), vacated on other grounds by
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 566 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1421 (2012);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1472 (lOth Cir. 1996) ("While [a
statute of limitations] . . . is 'a procedural device that operates as a defense to limit the
remedy available from an existing cause of action,' a statute of repose, in contrast,
'creates a substantive right in those protected to be free from liability after a legislativelydetermined period of time."') (quoting Webb v. United States, 66 F .3d 691, 700-01 (4th
Cir. 1995)); Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (lOth Cir. 2012); Albano v.
Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 254 P.3d 360, 366 (Ariz. 2011); Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp.,
290 P.3d 446 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012); Lane v. Vitek Real Estate Indus. Group, 713
F.Supp.2d 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Nett v. Bellucci, 774 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Mass. 2002);
Nolan v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 518 S.E.2d 789, 792 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) ("Ifplaintiff
fails to file within the prescribed period, the statute gives defendant a vested right not to
be sued."); Cyktor v. Aspen Manor Condo. Ass 'n, 820 A.2d 129 (N.J. Ct. App. 2003);
Zweig v. South Texas Cardiothoracic and Vascular Surgical Associates, PLLC, 373
S.W.3d 605 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012); Mills v. Wong, 155 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tenn. 2005)
("The running of the statute of repose ... has a substantive effect."); Calaway ex rei.
Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509, 515 (Tenn. 2005); Wenke v. Gehl, Co., 682
N.W.2d 405, 425 (Wis. 2004); see also 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1056, at 240 (3d ed. 2002) ("[A] repose period is fixed
and its expiration will not be delayed by estoppel or tolling.").
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the Subcontractor Defendants' breaches of contract and/or breaches of
warranty, which passes through to them.

41.
Should Knight Construction be found liable to the Tomlinsons for
any of the Home Defect claims asserted by them in the Third Amended
Complaint, and Judgement [sic] therefor is entered against Knight
Construction on those claims, then Knight Construction is entitled to
contribution and/or indemnification from Third-Party Defendants m
amounts proportionate to their respective fault and/or responsibility.
R. 879-920 (emphasis added to paragraph 39; paragraph 41 emphasis in original).
The allegations in the Third-Party Complaint make it abundantly clear that DKC
considers its indemnity/contribution claim to be a contract-based claim. However else
indemnity or contribution claims could be recast, based upon the language of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-2-225, such an issue need not be resolved by the Court as the allegations in
the Third-Party Complaint make the resolution of this issue clear. As indemnity and
contribution claims are contract-based claims, the six-year statute of repose period would
apply to them and would bar DKC from bringing them against Superior in its untimely
filed Third-Party Complaint.

C.

Public policy favors Superior based upon the Legislature's stated "social and
economic evils."
Few Utah statutes have the detailed codification of Legislative purpose and policy

as the builders statute of repose contains. Part of the reason is that UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-2-225 (and its predecessor UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5) was previously struck
down (see Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989)), amended by
the Legislature, and then withstood further constitutional scrutiny (see Craftsman
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Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194). One of the
reasons that the statute was able to later withstand constitutional scrutiny was because of
the codified list of issues the statute was designed to eliminate. Expressed as "social and
economic evils" these rationales are set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(2):
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors,
omissions, or breach of duty after the possibility of injury or damage
has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state;
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs,
records storage costs, undue and unlimited liability risks during the
life of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in
defending against claims many years after completion of an
improvement;
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic
evils;
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and
unexpected seven years following completion or abandonment; and
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of
the citizens of the state to impose the periods of limitation and
repose provided in this chapter upon all causes of action by or
against a provider arising out of or related to the design,
construction, or installation of an improvement.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(2).
Within these sections, the legislature makes reference to the "costs and hardships"
of defending a claim "many years after completion of an improvement" or "arising out of
or related to the design, construction, or installation of an improvement." !d. (emphasis
added). "Improvement" includes the changes, additions, modifications, and alternations
to the building as performed by Superior. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(l)(d). The

Craftsman court further discussed the consequences to which Superior would be
subjected if there was no six-year statute of repose (i.e., ifDKC's argument is adopted):
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The builders statute of repose at issue in the present case lists the specific
evils it desires to eliminate. Two of the stated evils concern costs to the
construction industry: liability insurance costs and records storage costs.
Absent a statute of repose, these costs would continue for the life of both
the provider and the improvement. Such costs could be significant and
would likely increase the cost of building, which undoubtedly would be
passed on to consumers. This may very well adversely impact the state's
economy by increasing the cost of living. The legislature also found that
liability risk extending for the lifetime of a provider and an improvement
constituted a social and economic evil. Many buildings in this state were
constructed decades ago, and some are even older than a century. While
some of the business entities responsible for such construction may still
exist, the individual providers who assisted in the construction may have
long since retired or passed away. The perpetual risk of liability to retired
individuals or to businesses whose current owners had nothing to do with
construction projects in the past undoubtedly creates a hardship to those
involved. We have recognized such hardship and have stated that
"[ c]ertainly there is a valid social interest in providing a time of repose--in
wiping the slate clean and not allowing possible mistakes of the past to
becloud an individual's life forever"--and that "[t]he practice of wiping out
past debts is an ancient one, rooted, indeed, in Old Testament times."
Horton, 785 P.2d at 1095. We hold that the above legislative concerns
identifY clear social and economic evils.
Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~ 20, 974 P.2d at 1200; see also Ocean Winds Corp., 556 S.E.2d

377.
Statutes of repose serve legitimate societal interests when enforced as enacted the
by the Legislature. Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of America, Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1161
(Utah 1989) ("Statutes of repose, however, are generally enacted to curb rising insurance
rates, to increase the availability of insurance, and to reduce the risk and uncertainty of
liability for manufacturers and those in the manufacturer's chain of distribution.").
Accordingly, when the Legislature established a six-year repose statute for contract and
warranty claims, the Legislature determined that filing suit more than six years after the
triggering event is socially harmful to the defendant (i.e., Superior). In other words, at
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some point, which the Legislature determined was six years for contract-based claims, a
company that performed work on a project should be able to rest knowing that it is free
from litigation. See, e.g., Nolan, 518 S.E.2d at 792 ("If plaintiff fails to file within the
prescribed period, the statute gives defendant a vested right not to be sued."). However,
even with this statute, Superior is incurring defense and potentially indemnity costs, is
still storing its files, and is litigating a case where it completed its work nearly 11 years
ago.
If there was any question regarding the interpretation of the builders statute of
repose in this case, all doubts should be resolved in favor of an interpretation of the
statute that best accomplishes the Legislature's stated purposes. Expanding the statute,
tolling the statute, or otherwise reading into the statute equitable remedies that are outside
the plain language of the statute to save a claim runs contrary to the rights that Superior
should be able to claim under the statute.
Finally, DKC's public policy argument is essentially an equitable tolling argument
under the pretext of public policy. There is, however, no tolling of a statute of repose (see
supra). The degree of hardship, costs, or difficulty in providing a defense is irrelevant

where the statute of repose was triggered and lapsed prior to the time suit was brought.
Superior should be entitled to rely upon the protections of the statute when it is clear that
the Residence was being used and possessed, at the latest, on March 17, 2006 when the
REPC was signed. Given the rationale and purposes of the statute, if anything, the public
policy considerations weigh in Superior's favor.
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IX. CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, this Court should affinn the Order of Judge
Harris and dismiss DKC's causes of action against Superior based upon the expiration of
the builders statute of repose. Clearly, the Tomlinson Residence was completed and was
being used and possessed sometime in March 2006 when it had been staged, fumished,
and was being marketed and put under contract for sale to the Tomlinsons. Inasmuch as
the builders statute of repose is triggered by the completion of any improvement, and use
or possession was the earliest trigger in this case, it is clear the claims against Superior
were untimely. The Order of Judge HmTis should be affirmed.
DATED this

S"'

day ofMarch, 2016.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
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Superior Insulation Co., Inc.
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